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INTRODUCTION
Some medical disputes are less amenable to resolution than
others. Sometimes efforts to resolve certain types of health care
conflicts reflect confusion or disagreement within society,
medicine, and law about underlying values. And sometimes, two
or more values at stake in a medical dispute conflict with each
other. In that situation, validating one set of values may preclude
validating another. Medical disputes about so-called “futile” care
reflect this pattern. The phrase “futility disputes” is used in this
Article to refer to disputes in which clinicians identify care being
provided to a patient as “futile”1 and, accordingly, seek the
termination of life-sustaining care even though the patient or his or
her surrogate decision maker seeks the continuation of that care.
These cases present a conflict between respect for autonomous
individuality and concern to shape the process of dying so that it is
not unduly burdensome for patients and their clinicians. The first
value—respect for autonomous individuality—is foundational in
contemporary bioethics.2 The second, an aspect of physician
beneficence, has become increasingly important in the last several
decades, even sometimes at the expense of patient autonomy.3

1. Sometimes other terms are used in place of “futile.” Clinicians may, for instance,
refer to “inappropriate,” “unwarranted,” or “ineffective” care. See infra note 9 and
accompanying text.
2. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
101–49 (7th ed. 2013).
3. Debbie Moore-Black, Go Quiet into the Night, KEVINMD (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2019/01/go-quiet-into-the-night.html. It is reflected in
public fora in efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide. The U.S. Supreme Court declined
to identify a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720–25, 728 (1997). However, a number of states, including California, Colorado,
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia, have authorized physicianassisted suicide by statutory law. Paola V. Jaime Saenz, Morris v. Brandenburg: Departing
from Federal Precedent to Declare Physician Assisted Suicide a Fundamental Right Under New
Mexico’s Constitution, 48 N.M. L. REV. 233, 234 (2018).
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Moral disputes about the continuation of care that a patient’s
clinicians have deemed futile resemble certain aspects of conflicts
at issue in a set of well-known cases, decided in the last decades of
the twentieth century, in which patients or their surrogates asked
to have life-sustaining care withheld or withdrawn while clinicians
sought to continue providing care.4 Each sort of dispute—those in
which patients (or surrogates) have requested the withdrawal of
life-sustaining care and those in which clinicians have made that
request—has involved questions about end-of-life decisionmaking. Both sets of disputes have challenged stakeholders’
responses to life, death, medicine, and personhood.
However, futility disputes,5 unlike disputes in which patients
or their surrogates have asked to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining care, involve clinicians and hospitals seeking to override
the preferences of patients and their surrogate decision makers who
favor the continuation of life-sustaining care. In short, medicalfutility disputes differ from disputes in which patients have sought
a so-called “right to die” insofar as futility disputes preclude
privileging both patient autonomy and the avoidance of lingering
deaths viewed as burdensome to patients and morally distressing
to other stakeholders. The right-to-die6 cases of the late twentieth
century recognized a patient’s right to make his or her own medical
decisions even if those decisions would result in death.7 In contrast,
medical-futility disputes threaten to undermine respect for patient
autonomy—a principle essential to contemporary medical
bioethics. As a result, futility disputes often cannot be resolved
through reliance on models developed in legal cases that provided

4. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding Missouri’s
clear and convincing evidence standard for surrogates attempting to show that
vegetative patient would have wanted care withheld); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)
(allowing father of patient in persistent vegetative state to authorize withholding of
respiratory support).
5. This Article uses the term “futility dispute” to refer to a situation in which
clinicians seek to end life-sustaining treatment against the wishes of the patient
(or surrogate).
6. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 (“This is the first case in which we have been squarely
presented with the issue as to whether the United States Constitution grants what is in
common parlance referred to as a ‘right to die.’”).
7. Id. at 279 (“[W]e assume that the United States Constitution would grant
a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition.”).
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for patients (or surrogates) to authorize the withdrawal or
withholding of care.8
The conflict that sits at the center of medical-futility disputes
has rendered those disputes significantly more resistant to
successful resolution than disputes in which patients, but not
clinicians, seek the termination of life-sustaining treatment. This
Article explores legal, moral, and social conundrums at the center
of so-called “medical futility disputes.”9 This Article shows how
challenging it has proven for each of three sets of institutional
arbiters—legislatures, courts, and hospital ethics consultants—to
help with resolving such disputes. That challenge notwithstanding,
this Article concludes that everything else being equal, ethics
consultations respond to futility disputes more successfully than do
statutory rules or court review. That said, there may be a call for
court review should an ethics consultation fail to result in
agreement and compromise among the stakeholders.
This Article compares the benefits and disadvantages that each
institutional approach—that of statutory law, courts, and hospital
ethics consultants—brings to medical-futility disputes. This
comparison involves cases of the most challenging sort in that each
case has been shaped by a basic, intransigent ideological conflict.
As a result, that conflict cannot easily be mediated.
Part I of this Article summarizes social and legal responses to
conflicts about dying, comparing medical futility disputes with
right-to-die cases. Part II describes two conflicting values that are
central to contemporary medical ethics. One is the value of
autonomous patient choice. The second is the value of beneficent
clinical care that places patient welfare at its center. This value is
closely linked with the notion of medical integrity.
Part III then describes statutory responses to futility disputes—
the first of three institutional responses to such disputes that are
reviewed in this Article. Part IV considers judicial responses to
futility disputes, suggesting some of the limitations of court review
as well as some of the advantages. Part V then reviews the work of
a hospital ethics consultation service in resolving futility disputes,
8. See also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.
9. Although somewhat difficult to define, the terms “futile” or “futility” most
frequently refer to disputes about “inappropriate care” (or other similar phrases).
Unless noted expressly, this Article uses the same definition of the word “futile” and its
derivative forms.
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contending that, at their best, these services balance the interests of
diverse stakeholders more adequately than other approaches. At
least as an initial response to futility disputes, ethics consultations
offer the approach most likely to resolve futility conflicts
successfully, without a wake of long-lasting acrimony.
I. “NEGOTIATING DEATH”10: CONFLICTS ABOUT HOW TO DIE
This Part considers similarities and differences between rightto-die cases and futility cases. In right-to-die cases, courts have
invoked the principle of patient autonomy in order to limit the
burdens imposed by life-sustaining treatment that was deemed
futile.11 In medical-futility cases, in contrast, clinicians authorize the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This
approach often conflicts with patient autonomy.12 A clear divide
separates these two sets of cases insofar as the centrality of the
principle of autonomy in medical ethics in the contemporary
United States is not paramount in the resolution of futility cases.
Thus, it is not surprising that cases involving patients or families
refusing to concur with clinician preferences for terminating
treatment deemed futile have often proved less amenable to
successful resolution13 than have right-to-die cases.
The challenge presented by futility cases follows from the
effort—almost certain to fail—to serve two sets of values that
conflict in medical-futility cases. In these cases, it is often necessary
to sacrifice respect for patient autonomy or to quash the conclusion
of a patient’s physicians that a patient’s life-sustaining care should
be discontinued for the sake of the patient and that of his or her
clinicians (who may undergo moral distress14 by continuing to
provide care deemed futile).

10. Nancy Dubler, Limiting Technology in the Process of Negotiating Death, 1 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 297 (2001).
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. See infra Section I.B.
14. Moral distress among clinicians, including frustration and anxiety, can lead to
burnout. See, e.g., Subha Perni, Moral Distress: A Call to Action, AMA J. ETHICS (June 2017),
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/moral-distress-call-action/2017-06.
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A. Patients or Their Surrogates Ask to Terminate Life-Sustaining Care:
A Right to Die
During the last decades of the twentieth century, a model
emerged for responding to cases in which patients or their
surrogates have sought to terminate life-sustaining care. That
model has attained widespread, if not unanimous, approval. In
1976, Joseph Quinlan, the father of a young woman in a persistent
vegetative state asked New Jersey’s highest court for the right to
authorize removal of his daughter’s respiratory support.15 Quinlan
contended that his daughter, Karen, had a constitutional right to
die, a right that could only be exercised by proxy since Karen no
longer enjoyed capacity.16 The trial court denied Quinlan the
authority he sought. Justice Hughes, writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, overturned that decision, even as he noted that
each of Karen’s doctors and other medical experts who testified in
court opposed withdrawing ventilatory support from Karen,
viewing that act as a violation of medical standards.17 Concluding
that were Karen capable, she would have asked to have lifesustaining care terminated, Justice Hughes grounded his decision
to authorize Karen’s father to make that choice for Karen on Karen’s
privacy right to refuse medical care.18 The case offered a new
perspective on end-of-life decisions for patients without decisionmaking capacity. Soon, that perspective was being widely followed
by courts in New Jersey and elsewhere.19
Fourteen years after Quinlan, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed
the right of a competent patient to refuse medical care, even if that
refusal was likely to lead to serious consequences for the patient—
even including death.20 The case involved Nancy Cruzan, a young
woman from Missouri, who, like Karen Quinlan, had entered into
15. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
16. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
17. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655. A more complete description of this case can be
found at Janet L. Dolgin, Dying Discourse: Contextualizing Advance Care Planning, 34
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 254–59 (2016).
18. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664, 671.
19. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 457 A.2d 1232, 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983)
(permitting guardian of patient to “cause the removal of the nasogastric tube”); In re
Christopher I., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 139 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at
665–66 for position that a court may order withdrawal of life-sustaining care to patient);
Newmark v. Williams/DCPS, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117–18 (Del. 1990).
20. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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a vegetative state. Nancy’s condition resulted from an automobile
accident.21 Her parents requested that their daughter’s clinicians
withdraw life-sustaining treatment. The case confirmed the
proposition that the right of a patient to decision-making autonomy
extended to decisions that were likely to end the patient’s life.22
Cruzan suggests significant respect for patient autonomy even
though the Court sided with the state of Missouri, which had
imposed a “clear and convincing” evidence standard on surrogate
decision makers seeking to have life-sustaining care withdrawn.23
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA), adopted a
few years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law,
offers a flexible approach to end-of-life decision-making by
patients’ surrogates.24 Professor Lois Shepherd, a legal scholar and
medical ethicist, described the UHCDA as a model for flexibility in
surrogate decision-making.25 The Act gives surrogates broad
authority to make health care decisions for patients. By the start of
the present century, every state had promulgated laws providing
for advance care planning.26 These laws vary from state to
state. In general, they provide for appointment of a surrogate
decision maker, should the principal lose capacity, and for
pre-incompetency delineation of preferences for medical care.27
These laws are predicated on a presumed right of competent
people to make their own health care decisions and to enjoy that
right through proxy should they become incompetent and need
medical care.

21. Id. at 266.
22. See id. at 279 (assuming right of patient to refuse food and water).
23. Id. at 265. The decision allows, but does not require, a high evidentiary standard
in such cases. After the Court’s decision, new evidence brought to court in Missouri about
Nancy’s pre-incompetency preferences regarding end-of-life care convinced a Missouri court
that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard had been met. Nancy Cruzan died in 1990
following withdrawal of her feeding tube. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a
Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/
27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlived-by-a-debate-over-the-right-to-die.html.
24. UNIF. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, 9 U.L.A. 83 (1993) [hereinafter UHCDA].
The Act is discussed in greater detail infra Section III.A.
25. Lois Shepherd, The End of End-of-Life Law, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1694, 1723 (2014).
26. See Normal Cantor, Twenty-five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of
Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 189 (2001).
27. See id.
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B. When Clinicians’ Recommendations to Terminate Life-Sustaining
Care Conflict with Patients’ or Surrogates’ Preferences: Development of
the Notion of Medical Futility
The second set of cases of concern to this Article—those in
which clinicians seek to terminate medical care while patients or
their surrogates seek to have the care in question continued—
conflict with the presumption that patients have the right to make
health care decisions for themselves. This set of cases is grounded
on the notion that clinicians’ recommendations to discontinue
care deemed inappropriate should trump patient autonomy.
The issue at stake in these cases—sometimes referred to as futility
disputes28—resembles that at stake in the cases considered
in Section A. However, the decision maker seeking withdrawal of
care is now the clinician, not the patient. Even more, these cases
confront clinicians recommending the withdrawal (or withholding)
of care with the contrary choices of patients or their surrogates
to continue life-sustaining care.29 This Section reviews the
history of the notion of “brain death” and suggests its relevance to
medical-futility disputes.
In the mid-1970s, the trial court judge in Quinlan reported that
the experts who testified against assenting to Joseph Quinlan’s
request to withdraw ventilatory support from his daughter, Karen,
saw termination of such support as “homicide and an act

28. Thaddeus Pope has attributed “three distinctive features” to medical futility
disputes. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Procedural Due Process and Intramural Hospital Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms: The Texas Advance Directives Act, 10 ST. LOUIS J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93,
102 (2016) [hereinafter Pope, Procedural Due Process]. First, these disputes focus on the
continuation or withdrawal of life-sustaining care (care without which a patient is likely to
die). Id. at 97–98. Examples of such care may include assisted nutrition and hydration,
ventilatory assistance, hemodialysis, and pressor support. Id. at 98. Second, the patient in
these cases generally does not have the capacity to make his or her own medical decisions.
Id. And third, typically, the primary disputing parties are the patient’s attending physician
and his or her surrogate decision maker. Id. Use of the term “futility” to describe the
justification for discontinuing treatment has increasingly been replaced with alternative
terms such as “non-beneficent care” or “inappropriate care.” Id. For ease of reference, this
Article mostly continues to refer to “futility” disputes.
29. Patients at the center of futility disputes are generally not able to make their own
medical decisions. Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 28, at 102. Thus, this Article will
almost always refer both to patients and their surrogates rather than to patients alone. That
usefully assumes (pursuant to contemporary law and ethics) that a surrogate’s medical
decisions for a patient reflect the patient’s autonomy.
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of euthanasia.”30 The court reported that virtually all of Karen’s
clinicians and those who testified at trial agreed that withdrawing
respiratory support from Karen would conflict with “medical
practices, standards, and traditions.”31 Yet, rapidly, in the decades
immediately following the New Jersey court’s decision in Quinlan,
medical opinion shifted dramatically.32
The roots of that change began to grow in the decade before the
Quinlan decision. At that time, Harvard Medical School created an
ad hoc committee to “examine the definition of death.”33
The committee’s report defined “irreversible coma as a new
criterion for death” for patients with “no discernible central
nervous system activity.”34 The committee was responding to the
development of life-sustaining treatments that could sustain
heartbeat and oxygenation in patients with “irreversibly damaged”
brains. It expressly hoped that its report would facilitate more
easily obtaining oxygenated organs for transplantation.35
This new definition of death encouraged elaboration of the
notion of medical futility. If a patient is dead, then it is hard to argue
with the claim that continuing care is futile.36 Setting the stage for
30. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976); see also Dolgin, supra note 17, at 257.
32. The notion of medical futility began to appear with some frequency in medical
literature in the mid-1980s. Paul R. Helft, Mark Siegler & John Lantos, Sounding Board: The
Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2000).
33. A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 337 (1968) [hereinafter
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
34. Id. at 337 (italics omitted).
35. Id.
36. In New York and New Jersey, the notion of brain death described here is optional
in the case of patients who would have had religious objections to defining death on the basis
of neurological criteria alone. See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW
516–17 (3d ed. 2013). Most states have adopted the formulation in the Uniform
Determination of Death Act. It provides: “An individual who has sustained either
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.“ UNIF. DETERMINATION OF
DEATH ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980). New York law allows clinicians to determine
death if an “individual . . . has sustained either: (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions; or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16 (2018). New York’s
law further provides that New York state hospitals should create a “written policy,” which,
among other things, describes “a procedure for the reasonable accommodation of the
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claims of medical futility seems to have been an unintentional,
though not surprising, consequence of the Harvard committee’s
report on brain death.37 This should not be read to suggest that the
notion of medical futility is isomorphic with that of brain death.
It is not. However, both notions suggest that in relevant—
presumptively hopeless—cases, continuing treatment is
inappropriate (“futile”). As with the movement within medicine to
define brain death as legal death, so advocates of the movement
within medicine to define continuing care as futile proposed early
in the movement’s development that physicians should be granted
authority to withhold or withdraw treatment deemed futile, even
over the objection of patients or their surrogates.38 That is to say,
patients were to be given little or no room to decide such matters
for themselves. This followed the model of the Harvard brain death
committee’s Ad Hoc Report, which had allocated the task of
declaring brain death to the “physician-in-charge” on the ground
that “[i]t is unsound and undesirable to force the family to make
the decision.”39 This power, though largely granted to physicians in
the context of brain death determinations, has been met with more
resistance in the context of treatments deemed futile,40 though state
laws, mostly promulgated in the 1990s, have confronted that
resistance with significant success.41
While it has been thought that brain death can be adequately
defined and identified on the basis of medical criteria,42 the same
cannot be said for futility determinations. Even characterizations of

individual’s religious or moral objection to the determination as expressed by the individual,
or by the next of kin or other person closest to the individual.” Id. at (e)(3).
37. The Report referred to and quoted an address offered by Pope Pius XII nine years
earlier in which he had declared that doctors should use “reasonable, ordinary means” to
restore “vital functions and consciousness” to patients but that “a time comes when
resuscitative efforts should be withdrawn, and death unopposed.” Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee, supra note 33, at 340 (paraphrasing Pope Pius XII in The Prolongation of Life, 4 POPE
SPEAKS 393 (1958)). Although this assertion was not about brain death, as a general matter, it
suggests flexibility with regard to end-of-life treatment.
38. Helft et al., supra note 32, at 293.
39. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 33, at 338.
40. Helft et al., supra note 32, at 293 (noting that “[f]utile care in hospitals is still very
much an issue”).
41. See infra Part III.
42. See, e.g., G. Bryan Young, Diagnosis of Brain Death, UPTODATE, https://www.
uptodate.com/contents/diagnosis-of-brain-death/print (last updated Mar. 8, 2018) (“Brain
death implies the permanent absence of cerebral and brainstem functions.”).
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treatment as medically “futile” can usually be debated. Identifying
life-sustaining treatment as “futile” does not generally mean that
the treatment is not, in fact, sustaining the patient’s life or goals for
care but that the patient is terminally ill or permanently vegetative
and is very unlikely to improve. Such characterizations of lifesustaining care as futile in particular cases have not always been
grounded on an accompanying presumption that the care in
question is not serving to sustain life. Care deemed inappropriate
may or may not be necessary to the support of continued cardiorespiratory functions.
A further parallel between the 1968 delineation of brain death
and the notion of futility treatment lurks in the Harvard
committee’s transparency about its definition of death resulting in
a wider supply of organs for patients whose lives depend on organ
transplantation.43 A rationing goal has also informed some
discussion of futility determinations, though generally that goal
has remained tacit. Robert Truog, writing of the case of a
desperately ill toddler on life support, acknowledged that health
care resources are limited, and doctors may carry an “obligation to
ensure that it is distributed fairly.”44 Yet, Truog concluded that
futility cases were not a good “target for cost cutting” because too
few cases actually meet the criteria for medical futility to result in
noteworthy societal savings, and most patients whose care might
be deemed futile die quickly even if provided with treatment,
generally precluding huge expenditures on treatment for them.45
Finally, those declared brain dead and most, though not all,
patients whose treatments are identified as futile are without
capacity to make their own medical decisions. Thus, decisionmaking in these cases generally falls to surrogates, appointed by
the patients while they were competent or appointed pursuant to
state law if the patient, while competent, did not nominate a
surrogate or the surrogate appointed is not available or not willing
to serve. In cases with surrogate decision makers, the patient’s
autonomy is putatively preserved through resort to a surrogate
whose decisions, most felicitously, reflect those that the patient
would make if she or her were competent. Moreover, patients for

43. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 33, at 337.
44. Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2007).
45. Id.
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whom continuing care is deemed futile are sometimes capable.
In practice, clinicians’ contravening the patient’s own preferences
may seem less acceptable because it is more openly dismissive
of patient autonomy than clinicians’ contravening the wishes
of a surrogate.
C. Physician-Assisted Suicide
The shift in clinician responses to end-of-life care in the decades
following In re Quinlan46 reflects a more widespread social pattern.
Increasingly, society and law accepted—and often applauded—the
notion that death is preferable to life for terminal patients facing
indignities and pain. That acceptance is reflected in the passage of
state laws that facilitate physician-assisted suicide. Physicianassisted suicide (or “physician aid-in-dying,” a phrase that some
prefer) is now legal in nine states (California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington)
and in the District of Columbia.47
The increasing acceptance of withdrawing end-of-life care
reflects the broader pattern that has resulted as well in states’
providing for physician-assisted suicide (aid-in-dying).48 There is,
however, an important distinction between futility determinations
that defy patient preferences and physician assistance with
requests by terminally ill patients to have increased control over
their own deaths, including even to end their lives. The statutes that
delineate terms for receiving lethal medication from a physician
require the patient, himself or herself, to ingest the medication
that will result in death. That is to say, these laws allow
physician-assisted suicide only for patients capable of autonomous
decision-making both at the time that the medication is requested
and at the time that it is ingested.

text.

46. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see also supra notes 22–31 and accompanying

47. States with Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG, https://euthanasia.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last updated July 25, 2019); Death with
Dignity: Maine, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/maine/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2020); Death with Dignity: New Jersey, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.
deathwithdignity.org/states/new-jersey/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
48. PROCON.ORG, supra note 47.
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The Oregon statute, the first of its kind, provided a model for
other states.49 Only a capable adult “who has been determined by
the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering
from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or
her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for the
purpose of ending his or her life.”50 The statute specifically
precludes use of a “lethal injection, mercy killing or active
euthanasia” by a physician or anyone else to end a patient’s life.51
Only the patient is permitted to initiate the request for medication
that, if ingested, will result in his or her death and actually to ingest
that medication.
In short, state laws providing for physician-assisted suicide
harmonize with the perspective that prolonging life is not
necessarily the best or most moral avenue for some patients.
However, these laws, following the model constructed in Oregon,
do not undermine patient autonomy. In that regard, cases
involving physician-assisted suicide in the jurisdictions in which it
has been legalized differ from medical-futility cases—cases in
which clinicians seek to terminate life-sustaining treatment in the
face of conflicting patient or surrogate preferences. Unlike the
withdrawal of care from a patient who has refused to consent to
that withdrawal, physician-assisted suicide responds to patients’
requests for help dying and does not undermine respect
for autonomy.
II. THE VALUES AT STAKE
Respect for patient autonomy has become a foundational value
in contemporary medical ethics.52 However, that value may conflict
with a second foundational value—the clinician’s ethical obligation
to provide beneficent care.53 This conflict has become a virtual
leitmotiv of futility disputes.
Moreover, in practice, patients—especially those reaching the
end of life—are not always capable of making their own medical

49. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2018).
50. Id. § 127.805(2.01)(1). Section 2.01(2) precludes anyone to qualify “under the
provisions of [the act] solely because of age or disability.” Id.
51. Id. § 127.880(3.14).
52. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 101–49.
53. Id. at 202–48.
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decisions. In response to this, law and medical ethics presume that
surrogates (often family members) substitute for patients, and that
their decisions are equivalent to the autonomous decisions the
patient would have made had the patient been capable. That
presumption substitutes a fragile subjunctive—e.g., “the decision
that the patient would have made”—for patient autonomy.
Clinicians’ efforts to withhold or withdraw care from patients
in cases in which the patient or his or her surrogate prefers that care
be continued undermine respect for patient autonomy. The advent
and development of “respect for autonomy” as a foundational
principle in American bioethics reflects a more widespread social
transformation within health care that brought individualist values
into the realm of medical care and the physician-patient
relationship in the last half of the twentieth century. In 1979, Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress’s first edition of Principles of
Biomedical Ethics delineated four basic principles in medical ethics.54
Autonomy was the first on the list. The authors expressly presumed
that “the everyday choices of generally competent persons are
autonomous.”55 They understood autonomous action as predicated
on intention, understanding, and a context of non-compulsion.56
The Belmont Report, drafted as a response to unethical human
subject research, describes informed consent as the primary
method of implementing autonomy (categorized as part of a
necessary “respect for persons”) in human subject research.57
Within health care settings, respect for autonomy is primarily
implemented through a patient’s granting informed consent to the
provision of medical care before care is provided. Indeed, patient
consent, grounded on the communication of information necessary
for the patient to make a reasonable medical choice, has become one
of the central tenets of medical ethics in the clinical setting. The
Christian theologian, Paul Ramsey, credited as the parent of
54. Id. at 13 (referring to “four clusters of moral principles: (1) respect for
autonomy . . . , (2) nonmaleficence . . . , (3) beneficence . . . , and (4) justice.”
55. Id. at 104.
56. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress defined “non-compulsion” (which they
refer to as “noncontrol”) in terms of an individual being “free of controls exerted either by
external sources or by internal states that rob the person of self-directedness.” Id.
57. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (Apr. 18, 1979), https://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-report/index.html.
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American bioethics, placed informed consent “at the heart of
medical care as a joint adventure between a patient and a doctor.”58
Ramsey, in contrast with many contemporary medical ethicists,
focused on consent, not autonomy.
In the context of clinical medicine, the principle asserting the
importance of respect for patient autonomy privileges the choices
of capable patients (or the surrogates of patients without capacity)
above other choices. The principle, as it operates in health care, does
not presume that choices that are operationalized because they are
the choices of autonomous patients are substantively more moral
than choices foregone by patients. Respect for individual autonomy
is paramount, not the content of the individual’s choices. The
significance paid to individual autonomy has been consonant with
the increasingly individualistic focus of American society, a focus
that has supported widespread commitment to safeguarding
untrammeled choice.
A surrogate’s decisions are generally accepted, in theory, if not
always in fact, as if they are presented as reflections of the patient’s
pre-incompetency choices.59 Yet, the need for surrogate decision
makers with authority to make medical decisions for patients who
no longer enjoy the capacity to make their own decisions
complicates the presumption that medical choices reflect a patient’s
autonomous preferences. Among the standards proposed for
surrogates,
two—”pure
autonomy”
and
“substituted
judgement”—reflect the presumption that the surrogate stands in
for the incompetent patient, making decisions that the patient
would make were he or she competent.60
Under a “pure autonomy” standard, the surrogate relies on
oral or written statements made by the patients before he or
she became incompetent. Advance directives were designed
with the expectation that they would ensure that patients’
58. Toni C. Saad, The History of Autonomy in Medicine from Antiquity to Principlism, 21
MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 125, 132–33 (2018), https://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007%2Fs11019-017-9781-2.
59. State laws may impose some limitations on the right of a surrogate to authorize
care or the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
60. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 226 (suggesting that “substituted
judgement” may be “presented as an autonomy-based standard”). The other standard is “the
patient’s best interests;” it can be applied in situations in which it is virtually impossible to
discern what the patient would have wanted. Id. at 227.

109

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2020

pre-incompetency preferences would be implemented.61 The
expectation that the laws providing for advance directives would
protect autonomy even for patients without capacity has not been
widely actualized, mostly because the majority of healthy,
non-elderly adults do not complete advance directives.62
In contrast, the “substituted judgement” standard, less clearly
reflective of patient autonomy, can be invoked whether or not the
patient signed an advance directive. It asks the surrogate “to make
the decision the incompetent person would have made if
competent.”63 By equating autonomy in its “pure” form with
autonomy in its more diluted form (“substituted judgement”),
surrogates are presumed to safeguard the autonomy of patients
whose incompetency precludes their making their own medical
decisions and who had not previously delineated their preferences
regarding various sorts of medical care or the absence of such care.
Society and the law have more easily developed paradigms and
guidelines for resolving disputes about end-of-life care when the
request to terminate care comes from patients than when it comes
from clinicians. Society, at least in the United States, deems it less
discomforting to sanction the withdrawal or withholding of lifesustaining care in cases in which patients or their surrogates seek
those ends than in cases in which patients or their surrogates
choose to continue life-sustaining care despite the patients’
clinicians suggesting that care be withheld or withdrawn.
Beneficent clinicians are expected to serve their patients,
effecting their best interests and protecting their welfare.64 Often
the principle is understood in the context of competing institutional
concerns, including, for instance, the costs of medical care.65
However, clinician beneficence—the clinician’s sense of a patient’s
best interests—may conflict with patient autonomy—the patient’s
divergent sense of his or her own best interests. This conflict sits

61. Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy,
88 MILBANK Q. 211, 218 (2010).
62. Id. at 221.
63. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 227.
64. Josué A. Zapata & Christopher Moriates, Case and Commentary, The High-Value
Care Considerations of Inpatient Versus Outpatient Testing, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J.
ETHICS 1022, 1023 (2015), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.amaassn.org/files/2018-05/ecas1-1511.pdf.
65. Id.
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behind many ethical disputes between patients, their family
members, and clinicians.
Clinicians, unable to implement what they view to be
beneficent care, may experience a challenge to their medical
integrity and may experience moral distress. This reflects the
clinicians’ conclusion that they are being prevented from providing
the best care for patients. The importance of protecting clinician
integrity has been linked directly to futility disputes. The Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association, as well as other medical groups in the United States
and abroad, has favored the right of clinicians unilaterally to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment deemed ineffective
(sometimes referred to as inappropriate or futile).66 Until the
middle of the twentieth-century, medicine in the United States was
proudly paternalistic. It was assumed that “doctor knows best.”67
While that perspective has largely dissipated, the notion of
professional “integrity” has preserved some elements of
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century medical paternalism.68
Law professor Thaddeus Pope has suggested that “[t]he ‘integrity
of the medical profession’ is an important societal interest that must
be balanced against patient autonomy.”69 Physicians rely on that
notion to justify attempts to implement the withholding or

66. AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS § 2.035 (“Futile Care”) (1994) (providing that “[p]hysicians are not ethically obligated
to deliver care that, in their best professional judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of
benefiting their patients. Patients should not be given treatments simply because they
demand them”); id. § 2.037 (“Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care”) (providing that “[w]hen
further intervention to prolong the life of a patient becomes futile, physicians have an
obligation to shift the intent of care toward comfort and closure”); see also Am. Thoracic Soc.,
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 726,
728 (1991); Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR): Integrated Adult Policy,
NHS SCOT., http://www.sad.scot.nhs.uk/media/16026/409019_dnacpr-p5.pdf (precluding
capable patient from “[d]emand[ing] CPR [cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] if it is clinically
judged that it would not be medially successful in achieving sustainable life for that patient”)
(last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
67. A.M. Stiggelbout, A.C. Molewijk, W. Otten, D.R.M. Timmermans, J.H. van Bockel
& J. Kievit, Ideals of Patient Autonomy in Clinical Decision Making, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 268,
271 (2004), https://jme.bmj.com/content/30/3/268, (referring to the “‘doctor knows
best’ factor”).
68. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to
Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2007) [hereinafter Pope,
No Safe Harbor].
69. Id.
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withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (in light of a conclusion that
such treatment can be “bad medicine” in relevant cases) even
though the patient or the patient’s surrogate has refused to consent
to the termination of treatment.70
The importance of safeguarding both clinician integrity and
patient autonomy suggests a difficult challenge—to identify an
appropriate balance between each set of concerns and interests.
That can be difficult, and in practice, achieving a satisfactory
balance is likely to depend on the context surrounding, and
interests at stake in, particular cases. In undertaking this task,
hospital ethicists must attend to the nuances of each approach in
constructing a response to divergent concerns and interests
underlying disputes between patients and clinicians.
III. STATUTORY RESPONSES TO MEDICAL-FUTILITY DISPUTES
Beginning in the early 1990s,71 states widely promulgated laws
aimed at responding to futility disputes. Physicians supported this
development. However, the results have proven generally
wanting. Many of the resulting laws have been “vague and
imprecise”72 and have not defined clear safe harbors for clinicians.
Doctors have thus often declined to rely on state-crafted medicalfutility laws for fear of suit should they authorize the termination
of life-sustaining care for patients whose surrogates ask that the
care in question be continued.73 In contrast with the majority of
state laws, one state law promulgated in Texas offers wide
protection to physicians who unilaterally discontinue lifesustaining treatment even in cases in which the patient or the
patient’s surrogate seeks the continuation of treatment. The price,
particularly for patients and their families, for the protection that
the Texas law offers to clinicians, however, is steep. The law can be
70. Id. at 16. Pope suggests three additional explanations of physicians’ support for
unilateral decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining care. Providers may conclude
that continuing care is burdensome to a patient and should thus be ended. Id. at 17. They
may view the continuation of treatment for patients deemed terminal as an assertion of false
hope. Id. And, finally, physicians may equate the continuation of care deemed futile with the
inappropriate use of scarce resources. Id. at 18. Pope notes that “[p]roviders want to be good
‘steward[s]’ of both ‘hard’ resources like ICU beds and ‘soft’ resources like health care
dollars.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id.
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viewed as an outgrowth of the virtually irreconcilable conflict
between respect for patient autonomy and clinician beneficence.74
The Texas law represents an extreme response to futility disputes.
It poses patient autonomy against clinicians’ concerns about the
continuation of life-sustaining care deemed burdensome and
inappropriate and largely displaces the value of patient autonomy
with that of clinician beneficence.
Section A of this Part briefly reviews the impetus to provide by
law for doctors unilaterally to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. It also describes the majority of state laws that grant
physicians this control. Section B then analyzes the implications
and consequences of the medical-futility law promulgated in Texas.
A. The Development of Laws Providing for Implementation of
Physicians’ Medical-Futility Determinations
In 1993, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
(UHCDA).75 The Act provides a model statute for states defining
and regulating medical decision-making for patients, including
incompetent patients. Some states have relied on the UHCDA as a
model for state legislation.76 The UHCDA delineates rules that
provide for the creation and revocation of advance directives as
well as rules regarding the selection and obligations of surrogate
decision makers for patients without capacity, including those who

74. At the start of the twenty-first century, Nancy Dubler characterized death in the
contemporary United States as a “negotiated event.” Dubler, supra note 10, at 297. For the
majority of people, death occurs when those with control decide to discontinue lifesustaining care. Id.
75. UHCDA, supra note 24; see supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
76. See UHCDA, supra note 24; see also Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The
Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062,
1074 (2018); David M. English, The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Acts and Its Progress in the
States, 15 PROB. & PROP. 19, 20 (2001) (noting that the UHCDA had been followed in a number
of states including, among other states: California, CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600–4805 (West
2000); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501–17 (2016); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327E1 to -16 (2019); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (repealed 2019);
Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229 (1999); and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (2015)). No state has promulgated a statute identical to the model law.
Stephen R. Baldassarri, Ike Lee, Stephen R. Latham & Gail D’Onofri, An Inter-Disciplinary
Examination: Debating Medical Utility, Not Futility, Ethical Dilemmas in Treating Critically Ill
People Who Use Injection Drugs, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 241, 244 (2018).
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did not finalize an advance directive.77 The primary goal of the
UHCDA has been to support a patient’s right to choose to receive
or to refuse recommended care.78 The construction of rules for
resolving disputes about futile care has been secondary.
The Act acknowledges the right of a competent individual to
decide all aspects of his or her own health care in all circumstances,
including the right to decline health care or to direct that health care
be discontinued, even if death ensues. An individual’s instructions
may extend to any and all health-care decisions that might arise
and, unless limited by the principal, an agent has authority to make
all health-care decisions which the individual could have made.
The Act recognizes and validates an individual’s authority to
define the scope of an instruction or agency as broadly or as
narrowly as the individual chooses.79 Yet, despite the significance
the Act gives to patient autonomy, the UHCDA grants clinicians
and health care institutions the right to refuse to provide medical
care that a patient’s clinicians deem “ineffective.”80
The Act carves out two exceptions to its broad grant of
autonomy to patients, either directly or through surrogate decision
makers.81 Both can be found in Section 7 of the UHCDA. Curiously,
it might seem, the Section reaffirms its commitment to patient
autonomy just before it delineates exceptions to that commitment.
It confirms that
[A] health-care provider or institution providing care to a patient
shall:
Comply with an individual instruction of the patient and with a
reasonable interpretation of that instruction made by a person
then authorized to make health-care decisions for the patient; and
Comply with a health-care decision for the patient made by a
person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the
patient to the same extent as if the decision had been made by the
patient while having capacity.82

77. See UHCDA, supra note 24.
78. See, e.g, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/u/uniform-health-care-decisions-act/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
79. See UHCDA, supra note 24.
80. Id. § 7(f).
81. Id. § 7(e)–(f).
82. Id. § 7(d)(1)–(2).
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Placement of this reaffirmation of the centrality of patient
autonomy in the Act’s text—just before delineation of two
exceptions—may not have been coincidental. By emphasizing the
significance of respect for autonomy in most, though not all,
situations, the text of the model law suggests that the need for some
exceptions is compelling and also that exceptions delineated in the
Act should be framed so that, in practice, they will be implemented
in a context of responsible, careful deliberation.
The
first
exception
involves
“health-care
provider[s . . . offering] reasons of conscience” for not complying
with a patient’s preference.83 The second—directly relevant to
medical-futility disputes—pertains to health care deemed
“medically ineffective” or “contrary to generally accepted healthcare standards applicable to the health-care provider or
institution.”84 The Act does not define “medically ineffective.”85
Defining the phrase could have created additional confusion and
encouraged open disagreement.86 The significance of the inclusion
of the phrase “medically ineffective” is unclear.87 Perhaps it was
intended to encourage reasoned physician conclusions not (or not
yet) incorporated in the profession’s “standard of care.”
The UHCDA further provides that if a clinician or institution
refuses to comply with a patient or surrogate’s preference, that
clinician or institution must notify the patient or surrogate, offer
care to the patient until he or she can be transferred to another
facility, and assist in trying to arrange the patient’s transfer to a
clinician or institution ready to comply with the patient or
surrogate’s preferences.88 The Act provides for the continuation of

83. Id. § 7(e).
84. Id. § 7(f). A number of states that permit health care clinicians or institutions to
refuse to comply with patients’ or patients’ surrogates’ request for continuing life-sustaining
care follow the post-refusal obligations set forth in the UHCDA. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-215(7)(a)–(c) (West 1999).
85. UHCDA, supra note 24, § 7(f).
86. Charles P. Sabatino, The New Uniform Health Care Decisions Act: Paving a Health Care
Decisions Superhighway?, 53 MD. L. REV. 1238, 1251–52 (1994) (“‘[M]edically ineffective’ . . . is
subject to differing and volatile views that trigger debate over larger issues of rationing,
resource allocation, and definitions of futile treatment.”).
87. Id. at 1251.
88. UHCDA, supra note 24, § 7(g)(1)–(3). The patient or patient’s surrogate has the
right, pursuant to the terms of the UHCDA, to “refuse[] assistance” with the patient’s
transfer. Id.
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care for the patient until transfer.89 This suggests that care cannot
be terminated if a transfer cannot be arranged.90 Yet, as Charles
Sabatino, a law professor and Director of the ABA Commission on
Law and Aging, has noted, a patient may be “vulnerable to
noncomplying providers in locales in which transfer to another
provider is difficult or impossible.”91
Most states now provide for health care professionals and
institutions to refuse to comply with health care choices of patients
or surrogates if those choices are deemed ineffective, futile, or
inappropriate.92 Few states use the term “futile” in their advance
directive laws, instead using terms such as “ineffective or
inappropriate care.”93 About ten states use the term “medically
ineffective,” but only four of those states have defined the phrase.94
89. Id. § 7(g)(2).
90. See Ashley Bassel, Note, Order at the End of Life: Establishing a Clear and Fair
Mechanism for the Resolution of Futility Disputes, 63 VAND. L. REV. 491, 504 (2010) (noting
apparent conflict in rule requiring continuing care until transfer and rule noting use of “all
reasonable effort” to arrange transfer as appropriate response to futility dispute).
91. Sabatino, supra note 86, at 1252.
92. See Charles Sabatino, Dir., Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on L. & Aging, Address at the
University of Maryland: Overview of State “Futility” Laws (Nov. 30, 2010).
93. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-67 (West 2013) (giving patient right to seek
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care if a clinician deems it “likely to be
ineffective or futile in prolonging life” or to only lengthen “an imminent dying process”); see
also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4514(6) (West 2017).
94. For example, Alaska permits health care providers, institutions, and facilities to
refuse to provide “medically ineffective” health care. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.060(f) (West
2008). The state defines the phrase to mean “care that according to reasonable medical
judgment cannot cure the patient’s illness, cannot diminish its progressive course, and
cannot effectively alleviate severe discomfort and distress.” Id. Additionally, both Delaware
and Maryland define “medically ineffective treatment” as “a medical procedure” that will
not “prevent or reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or prevent the
impending death of an individual.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2501(m) (West 2016); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(o). New Mexico’s law also defines “medically ineffective health
care” as “treatment that would not offer the patient any significant benefit, as determined by
a health-care practitioner.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(F) (West 2015). Virginia relies on the
phrase “medically or ethically inappropriate” care. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990(B) (West
2018). The Virginia law provides that invoking the notion of inappropriate care in
determining that a patient’s care should be withdrawn, even in the face of the patient’s
contrary preference “shall be based solely on the patient’s medical condition and not on the
patient’s age or other demographic status, disability, or diagnosis of persistent vegetative
state.” Id. Virginia’s law further provides that the article should not “be construed to
condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing or euthanasia or to permit any affirmative or
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.” Id.
§ 54.1-2990(D). Such statutory provisions play a role in resolving debate about life-sustaining
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Some states’ medical-futility laws carve out broad exceptions to
the right of patients to have their decisions implemented.95 Other
states allow clinicians to refuse to comply with patient preferences
on the grounds of “conscience”96 or more generally, for moral,
ethical, religious or professional reasons.97 Still other state laws
expressly carve out “futile” care as an exception to the requirement
that medical care is predicated on patient consent. Such laws permit
clinicians to refuse to provide care considered “medically
inappropriate or futile” even in cases in which that decision
contravenes a patient or surrogate’s stated preference.98
Yet, in fact, clinicians have generally not relied on these laws
unilaterally to terminate life-sustaining care in opposition to the
wishes of a patient or surrogate decision maker.99 That may reflect
the absence of clear safe harbors for clinicians anxious to terminate
care deemed futile despite the contrary preferences of the patient
or surrogate. Although these laws may encourage physicians to
initiate conversations with patients and surrogates that may result
in compromise (e.g., waiting for a specified period to see if the
patient improves), the vast majority of state futility statutes have
not provided physicians with a modus vivendi for routinely
resolving disputes about the continuation of care deemed futile.

treatment in states that rely on a substantive, rather than a process-based, approach to futility
disputes. See Andrew M. Courtwright & Emily Rubin, Healthcare Provider Limitation of
Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Patient or Surrogate Consent, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442,
442–51 (2017).
95. Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 68, at 62.
96. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734 (West 2000).
97. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 14 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-3428 (2019).
98. IDAHO CODE § 39-4514(6). Idaho defines futile care as “a course of treatment,” not
“comfort care”; it also states further:
(a) For a patient with a terminal condition for whom, in reasonable medical
judgment, death is imminent within hours or at most a few days whether or not
the medical treatment is provided and that, in reasonable medical judgment, will
not improve the patient’s condition; or
(b) The denial of which in reasonable medical judgment will not result in or hasten
the patient’s death.
Id.
99. Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 68, at 68.
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B. The Texas Advance Directive Act100
The Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA)101 differs from other
states’ futility laws. In Texas, lawmakers promulgated rules about
responding to futile care that effectively abandon the principle of
autonomy. The Texas law permits clinicians102 to withhold or
withdraw care despite a patient or surrogate’s explicit refusal to
consent to the termination of medical care.
The Texas law provides that an ethics committee should review
a physician’s decision not to “honor a patient’s advance directive
or a health care or treatment decision made by or on behalf of a
patient.”103 The protections offered to the patient, detailed in TADA
section 166.046(b), may appear to mimic due process protections.
However, these protections apply at the level of the hospital’s
review committee and effectively preclude court review of an ethics
committee affirmance of a physician’s decision to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment in opposition to the preferences
of a patient or that patient’s surrogate decision maker.104
If the ethics committee reaches a decision in conflict with the
preferences of the patient or the patient’s surrogate, the patient
may be transferred if an alternative facility that will accept the
patient can be identified.105 The patient is responsible for the costs
of transfer.106

100. Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 166.001–
166.209 (West 1999).
101. Id.
102. TADA can be invoked by patients as well as clinicians. However, it is usually
invoked by clinicians. Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 28, at 115.
103. TADA § 166.046(a).
104. Id. § 166.046(b). The patient or surrogate “may” be given a description in writing
of the committee’s process, policies and procedures, id. § 166.046(b)(1); they “shall” be told
that the review committee will meet “not less than 48 hours before the meeting,” id.
§ 166.046(b)(2); and “shall” be offered a copy of various documents related, among other
things, to their potential interest in having the patient transferred, id. § 166.046(b)(3)(A)–(B).
The patient or surrogate is permitted to “attend the meeting” and “receive a written
explanation” of the committee’s decision, a copy of the patient’s medical record and
“reasonably available diagnostic results and reports.” Id. §§ 166.046(b)(4)(C)–(D). The
primary stakeholders—including the patient, his or her surrogate, and his or her clinicians—
may attempt to transfer the patient. Id. § 166.046(e).
105. Id. § 166.046(d).
106. Id. § 166.046(e).
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The section of TADA that provides for transfer limits the period
during which life-sustaining treatment is maintained:
The attending physician, any other physician responsible for the
care of the patient, and the health care facility are not obligated to
provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day after both the
written decision [of the ethics committee] and the patient’s
medical record . . . are provided to the patient or the person
responsible for the health care decisions of the patient . . . .107

The patient or surrogate can apply to “the appropriate district
or county court” to extend the ten-day period before failure to
transfer results in cessation of life-sustaining treatment.108 An
extension may be granted if the court finds “that there is a
reasonable expectation that a physician or health care facility that
will honor the patient’s directive will be found.”109
The primary benefit of TADA—at least from the perspective of
those interested in precluding the continuation of care deemed
futile—is the clear safeguard it offers to clinicians who seek to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment against the wishes
of the patient or the patient’s surrogate.110 It thereby offers relief to
clinicians experiencing moral distress at being asked to continue
caring for patients whose care they deem inappropriate and
ineffective.111 TADA also limits the time during which intractable
disputes about life-sustaining patient care can fester. Once
a hospital ethics committee determines that care can be withheld
or withdrawn, dissenters have ten days within which to arrange
a transfer of the patient or obtain an extension of the time
limit in court.112
Yet, the law as a whole is concerning.113 It negates important
goals central to contemporary health care and to the legal order,
including autonomy and informed consent. It displaces the
possibility of hospital ethics consultants resolving such disputes by

107. Id.
108. Id. § 166.046(g).
109. Id.
110. Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 28, at 106.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 108–112 and accompanying text.
113. TADA’s significant deficiencies are further discussed in Janet Dolgin, Re-Making
the “Right to Die”: Give Me Liberty but Do Not Give Me Death, 73 SMU L. REV. 47 (2020).
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granting ethics committee decisions the force of law. Even more,
with limited exception, the review of a hospital’s ethics committee
is not appealable in court.114 That renders the ethical committee
decision far more consequential than a comparable lower court
decision would be because a court decision can be appealed.
Law Professor Nora O’Callaghan has described TADA’s
dangers. Among them, TADA protects even “negligent, reckless,
and . . . intentionally malicious decisions to withhold LST [lifesustaining treatment].”115 There is no requirement that a patient
subject to TADA’s withdrawal-of-care provisions be terminally
ill.116 The transfer option is largely illusory since there is very little
chance that an alternative facility will accept a patient once “the
treatment team and the ethics committee” have decided that
“further treatment is futile.”117 Finally and most disturbing, TADA
would seem to “deprive the patient of any other recourse to the
courts beyond [the] limited time-extension procedure.”118
Remarkably, TADA proceeds as if the informed consent
doctrine had not been cemented in American law during the
previous several decades119 and as if respect for patient autonomy
were not central to medical ethics. Ironically, the larger statute is
deferential to the principle of autonomy. The statute handles
provisions about futile medical care differently120 than it handles
decisions about other sorts of medical care.121 In a comprehensive
critique of TADA’s conflicts and limitations, Nora O’Callaghan
suggests that the Texas law “jettisons many fundamental principles
114. Nora O’Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility
Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 545 (2008). A patient
or his or her decision maker may seek an extension of the ten-day waiting period.
TADA § 166.046(e).
115. O’Callaghan, supra note 114, at 539. Section 166.045(d) of the Texas Health and
Safety Code offers strikingly broad immunity protection: “A physician, health professional
acting under the direction of a physician, or health care facility is not civilly or criminally
liable or subject to review or disciplinary action by the person’s appropriate licensing board
if the person has complied with the procedures outlined in Section 166.046.” TADA
§ 166.045(d).
116. O’Callaghan, supra note 114, at 529; see TADA § 166.044.
117. O’Callaghan, supra note 114, at 544 (citing Robert L. Fine & Thomas Wm. Mayo,
Letter to the Editor, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1575 (2000)).
118. Id. at 545.
119. See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text.
120. O’Callaghan, supra note 114, at 578; see also supra notes 59–60.
121. O’Callaghan, supra note 114, at 579.
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of American due process and medical law and ethics without
explanation or justification.”122
Texas’s legislators responded to a difficult—if not intractable—
moral conflict by promulgating a law that, in practice, can deprive
seriously ill patients (or their surrogates) of virtually all control
over their medical care should their physicians, supported by the
hospital’s ethics committee, deem that care inappropriate. The law,
as O’Callaghan asserted, eviscerates “fundamental principles of
American due process and medical law and ethics.”123
TADA has offered broad protection to hospitals and to
clinicians who determine that continuing care is futile and who
seek to discontinue the care in question. But the cost to patients and
their families is high. The potential consequences of TADA’s rule
for patients and their surrogates are harsh.124 TADA should be
viewed as an experiment that has failed. As the following two Parts
show, the responses, respectively, of courts and hospital ethics
consultants to futility disputes, though often imperfect, are
preferable to a statutory response that eviscerates some of the
central values of contemporary medical ethics.
IV. RESOLUTION OF FUTILITY CASES BY COURTS
This Part considers judicial responses to futility disputes.
Section A considers two futility cases occasioned by disputes
between a patient’s family members and the patient’s clinicians.
Section B then considers a futility case that involved intrafamilial
disagreements. Each of these court cases matches an ethics case
entertained by ethics consultants (analyzed in Part V of this
Article). As a result, read in combination with their matching ethics
cases, the court cases reviewed in this Part provide a useful
framework for comparing court review with that of a hospital’s

122. Id. at 582. O’Callaghan further asserts: “Hence, it is not surprising that the .046
provision is fraught with a cascade of policy problems, all related ultimately to the basic
denial of the importance of human dignity, accountability, and autonomy.” Id. at 582–83.
123. Id. at 582.
124. See Truog, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that TADA gives hospital ethics committees
the role of “a surrogate judge and jury, with the statutory power to authorize clinicians to
take actions against the wishes of a patient and family”).
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ethics consultation service.125 The comparison facilitates assessing
the comparative benefits and limitations of each mode of review.
A. Court Resolution of Futility Disputes Between Patients or Their
Surrogates and Clinicians
The two cases considered in this Section reflect contrasting
perspectives about who should bear ultimate responsibility for
decisions about continuing care in futility cases. In the first case
considered here, a Minnesota court held for a patient’s spouse who
refused to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining care. In the
second case, a California court authorized the withdrawal of lifesustaining care, contravening the patient’s advance directive as
well as her surrogate’s medical decision for the patient after she lost
capacity. Neither case asked for explicit review of a “futility”
determination. Yet, in different ways, each decision speaks to
that matter.
The first case, In re Wanglie, decided in 1991, was brought by a
clinician during the patient’s life.126 The case posed clinicians’
best judgements about medical care against family members’
preferences. Helga Wanglie’s pre-incompetency choices were
murky, but her husband and children opposed the withdrawal of
life-sustaining care. Helga’s husband claimed that Helga would
have agreed with him and his children about this. Even though
Helga was in a severely compromised physical and mental state,
her family did not view life-sustaining care as futile. That care
accomplished what they hoped it would accomplish: it kept Helga
alive. Helga’s physicians, however, saw continuing care as
inappropriate, even harmful to their patient, and thus as a violation
of their integrity as doctors.127

125. Futility disputes handled by a hospital ethics consultation service are described in
Section B of this Part.
126. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Prob. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 (1991).
127. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician’s
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1244–45 (1993) (describing In re Wanglie as a
case of “patient paternalism”).
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Helga suffered from a number of serious medical conditions.128
She entered into an unconscious state in May 1990.129 She was
placed on a respirator and could not be weaned.130 Several months
later, Helga’s clinicians recommended withdrawal of lifesustaining care. When her husband and two adult children refused
to consent, Dr. Steven Miles petitioned a Minnesota court to remove
Oliver Wanglie as conservator for his wife and to appoint a
substitute conservator.131 In an article published in the New
England Journal of Medicine in the same year, Miles contended that
physicians should not be obliged to provide inappropriate,
injurious, or extraneous care.132 Further, Dr. Miles suggested that
lawmakers are “ill suited to define medical appropriateness.”133
Accordingly, he did not ask the court to order termination of
Wanglie’s life-sustaining care but to deprive Helga’s husband of
authority to make medical decisions for Helga.134
Thus, on its face, the In re Wanglie case was about how best to
select a surrogate decision maker for a patient without capacity. To
that question, the court responded by declaring that Oliver Wanglie
was better-suited to make medical decisions for his wife “of fiftythree years . . . [than was] a stranger.”135 Helga died less than a
week after the Minnesota court concluded that her husband should

128. A Minnesota probate court noted that Helga Wanglie suffered from six serious
medical conditions. In re Wanglie, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 375. These included:
a. Aortic insufficiency murmur; b. Congestive heart failure; c. Chronic recurrent
pneumonias secondary to underlying lung disease, unconsciousness, and
recumbency; d. Bilateral Atelectasis and calcified lung disease; e. Chronic
respiratory insufficiency with dependence on mechanical ventilation, which her
physicians have concluded is irreversible; f. Persistent vegetative state with no
change in one year, i.e., unconsciousness since her cardiorespiratory arrest on May
23, 1990, which her physicians have concluded is irreversible.
Id.
129. Helga fractured a hip. While in transport from a nursing home to the Hennepin
County Medical Center, she suffered an episode of respiratory arrest. Id. at 374.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 371.
132. See Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for “Non-Beneficial” Medical Treatment, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 513 (1991).
133. Id. at 514.
134. Id.
135. In re Wanglie, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 376.
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be permitted to continue to make medical decisions for her.136
In effect, the court in In re Wanglie supported a vision of
family autonomy. Family autonomy differs from the nomination
of surrogate decision makers in that family autonomy does
not privilege the views of one family member above those of
others while a surrogate is understood as standing in for an
incompetent patient.137
In the wake of In re Wanglie, commentators have addressed an
underlying, though often unaddressed, issue in futility cases—the
wisdom of expending significant sums of money on the type of care
that Helga Wanglie received.138 As a practical matter, funding for
Helga Wanglie’s care was not at issue in the case because insurers
reimbursed the hospital for that care.139 Had Dr. Miles invoked the
cost of Helga’s care, whatever sympathy the court or the public felt
for Miles’s position at the time might have dimmed significantly.140

136. See, e.g., D. John Doyle, Exploring the Medical Futility Debate: The Tragic Case of Helga
Wanglie, http://danieljohndoyle.com/uploads/3/4/3/7/34375475/fultiliy_essay_2012.pdf
(April 2012) (noting that Helga Wanglie died on July 4, 1991 “of multisystem organ failure”).
137. This difference is likely to be more important as a matter of theory than as a matter
of practice. But it does alter the framework within which society envisions medical decisionmaking for patients without capacity.
138. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 136; Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora’s Box:
The Tragedy of Current Right-to-Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133, 147 (1991)
(estimating total costs to have been between $800,000 and $1,000,000); see also supra note 70
and accompanying text (considering values that compete with the value of autonomy). Doyle
reports a somewhat lower figure for the cost of Wanglie’s care (in 1991)—about $750,000.
Doyle, supra note 136. Doyle noted that the Ethics Committee of The Society of Critical Care
Medicine prepared a Society policy (1997) on futility: “Treatments that are extremely
unlikely to be beneficial, are extremely costly, or are of uncertain benefit may be considered
inappropriate and hence inadvisable, but should not be labeled futile.” Id. (citing Ethics
Comm. of the Soc’y of Critical Care Med., Consensus Statement of the Society of Critical Care
Medicine’s Ethics Committee Regarding Futile and Other Possible Inadvisable Treatments, 25 CRIT.
CARE MED. 887 (1997)). Dr. Marcia Angell expressed dismay about the “resources [that] are
spent sustaining the lives of patients who will never be sentient” but concluded that
“permitting ourselves to withdraw life support from a patient simply because it would save
money” presented a worrisome slippery slope. Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie – A
New Kind of “Right to Die” Case, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 511, 512 (1991).
139. See Daar, supra note 127, at 1270; Roach, supra note 138, at 147 (noting that all of
Helga Wanglie’s hospital costs were paid by Medicare or by private insurance companies).
140. Sandra M. Terra & Suzanne K. Powell, Editorial: Is a Determination of Medical Futility
Ethical?, 17 PROF’L CASE MGMT. 103 (2012), https://www.nursingcenter.com/journalarticle?
Article_ID=1330164&Journal_ID=54025&Issue_ID=1330163#P37 (noting that in clinical
care, it is “at best, socially unacceptable” to make medical decisions on the basis of
“cost, consideration of socioeconomic status, age, gender, or other nonclinical factors as
primary determinants”).
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Yet, questions about the high cost of the care that Wanglie received
pointed to one of the surviving “elephants” in the medical-futility
room—the cost of end-of-life care.141
In Alexander v. Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla,142 decided
fourteen years after In re Wanglie, a California court sided with the
patient’s clinicians. This case resembled In re Wanglie in posing a
patient’s clinicians, who sought withdrawal of life-sustaining care,
against the patient’s family.143 But it differed from In re Wanglie on
a number of dimensions. First, the case was brought by the patient’s
family, after the patient’s death—a death that resulted from the
withdrawal of life-sustaining care authorized by the patients’
clinicians.144 Most court cases involving disputes about
non-beneficial care resemble Alexander in that they were initiated
after the patient’s death.145 Second, the patient, Elizabeth Alexander
(age seventy), who suffered from aggressive pancreatic cancer, had
made her pre-incompetency preferences for continuing care clear
through an advance directive and had appointed one of
her children, a son named Christopher, as her health care
decision maker.146
The legal case was initiated by Elizabeth’s children after their
mother’s death. The suit was against Scripps Memorial Hospital La
Jolla (“Scripps Memorial”), where Elizabeth had been treated,

141. Peter Ubel remarks that the terms such as “‘parsimony,’ ‘value,’ and ‘CER’” are
now employed in place of the term “rationing.” Peter A. Ubel, Why It’s Not Time for Health
Care Rationing, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 15, 16 (2015). Some have suggested that CER—
“comparative effectiveness research,” a term introduced with the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—aims to compare modes of care but can also be used to justify
what is, in effect, rationed care. See, e.g., Kathryn Nix, Comparative Effectiveness Research Under
Obamacare: A Slippery Slope to Health Care Rationing, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2012),
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/comparative-effectivenessresearch-under-obamacare-slippery-slope-health. Further consideration of responses to the
costs of end-of-life care is beyond the scope of this article.
142. Alexander v. Scripps Mem’l Hosp. La Jolla, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 740
(Ct. App. 2018).
143. Id. Alexander was treated at the Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla.
144. Id.
145. Thaddeus Mason Pope has collected and posted online “key cases” involving
disputes raising issues about medical futility and “non-beneficial ICU treatment.” Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Medical Futility & Non-Beneficial Treatment Cases, https://www.
thaddeuspope.com/futilitycases.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Pope, Medical
Futility]. Pope has posted about sixty U.S. cases relating to these issues that were decided
between 1980 and 2016; four or five of them preceded In re Wanglie. Id.
146. Alexander, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 740.
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and against clinicians at the hospital.147 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants, by failing to provide cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation when Elizabeth experienced cardiac failure, had
violated the standards of good medical care and had contravened
Elizabeth’s advance directive.148 Thus, in contrast with In re
Wanglie, Alexander was brought after a decision to terminate care
had been implemented and after the patient’s death.149
A California appellate court affirmed a trial court decision in
favor of the defendants.150 The court concluded that “a patient’s
right to control his or her own health care” is not without limits.151
That the patient expressed (or through an advance directive, had
expressed) a contrary position did not alter the presumption that
clinicians have room to limit patients’ control over their health care
decision-making.152 In short, the court concluded that the treatment
preferences expressed in Elizabeth Alexander’s advance directive
and by her surrogate decision maker after she lost capacity were
trumped by the clinicians’ conclusion that the care requested
was inappropriate.
From the perspective of the informed consent doctrine, and the
principle of respect for patient autonomy on which that doctrine is
grounded, this is a surprising conclusion. It suggests that the ethical
obligation to respect patient autonomy (either directly or through a
surrogate)153 can be outweighed and elided by clinicians’
conclusions about the appropriateness of care. The notion is not
unique to Alexander. It has also been inscribed in statutory law as
described in Part III.154
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 742–43. When Elizabeth suffered cardiopulmonary arrest, CPR was not
initiated. Id. at 743.
150. Id. at 740.
151. Id. at 756.
152. Id. Explaining this point, the Alexander court quotes the state’s Probate Code,
Section 4735: “A health care provider or health care institution may decline to comply with
an individual health care instruction or health care decision that requires medically
ineffective health care or health care contrary to generally accepted health care standards
applicable to the health care provider or institution.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West 2000).
153. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 13 (noting “respect for autonomy[,]
a norm of respecting supporting autonomous decisions” to be one of the “pivotal moral
principles” in contemporary bioethics).
154. See infra Part III (considering statutory responses among the states to care
deemed inappropriate).
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B. Court Resolution of Family Disagreement About Continuing
Life-Sustaining Care
The case considered in this Section differs from In re Wanglie
and Alexander in that the underlying dispute about end-of-life care
developed among the patient’s family members rather than
between family members and clinicians.155 Indeed, Bernstein v.
Superior Court156 reflects the terribly dismal consequences that an
intrafamilial dispute about a parent and spouse’s end-of-life care
can spawn.157 The case illustrates the dire impact on family
members and potentially on patient care of a surrogate decision
maker (one of the patient’s three sons in the Bernstein case)
displacing the patient’s preferences as well as those of other family
members with his own preferences. Bernstein suggests a perversion
of autonomous control by a presumptive surrogate.
Karl Bernstein had been diagnosed with Alzheimer disease.
He also suffered from a number of comorbidities. He was unable to
communicate, “eat or swallow, and . . . unable to undertake any
volitional act.”158 Karl’s clinicians, his wife, and two younger sons
believed that continuing care had “no medical or therapeutic value
for Karl.”159 Karl had not completed an advance directive.
Scot, Karl’s oldest son by a previous wife, insisted on serving as
his father’s surrogate decision maker.160 Initially, Karl’s wife, Olga,
had acceded to Scott’s control.161 From 1999 until 2008, Scott
demanded that Karl be treated aggressively.162 Karl entered a
persistent vegetative state in 2003 and was moved to a nursing
home in 2005. At the time, he was connected to “tracheostomy,
jejunostomy, and gastrostomy tubes.”163 Olga, Karl’s wife, along
with Ilya and Nicholas (sons of Olga and Karl and Scott’s

155. See infra Section IV.B for consideration of similar cases handled by ethics
consultation service.
156. Bernstein v. Superior Ct., No. B212067, 2009 WL 224942 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009).
157. Id. at *1. In addition to Alzheimer disease, Karl suffered from Parkinson’s
hypertension and aspiration pneumonia. Id.
158. Id. at *2.
159. Id.
160. Catherine Saillant, Family Is Split Over Man’s Fate, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/26/local/me-righttodie26.
161. Id.
162. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *2.
163. Id.
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half-brothers) sought to have these tubes withdrawn. But Scott’s
position remained unchanged, despite increasingly raw conflicts
with his stepmother and half-brothers. Finally, in 2008, Ilya and
Nicholas sought court assistance.164 They hoped to limit Scott’s
control over their father’s care or, alternatively, to have Scott
replaced as Karl’s conservator.165
The trial court heard testimony from sixteen people over five
days.166 The court then removed Scott as Karl’s conservator,
replacing him with Ilya. Scott appealed. The appellate court
affirmed, even as it suggested that, whenever possible, “judicial
intervention . . . should be minimal” in such cases.167 In affirming
Scott’s replacement with Ilya, the appellate court pointed
to Ilya’s readiness to consider the issues carefully in order to
serve Karl’s best interests.168 Presumably, once Ilya became
his father’s conservator, the life-sustaining treatment at issue
was withdrawn.169
The relationships in Bernstein between Scott and his halfsiblings and stepmother are notable for their dysfunctionality.
Intrafamilial disputes about the continuation—or not—of lifesustaining care for a loved one rarely involve the level of suffering
and animosity that characterized relationships within the Bernstein
family.170 That state of affairs reflects surrogate decision-making
gone amok.
164. Id. at *3. Ilya and Nicholas delineated “medically futile” treatments to include
“intramuscular antibiotic injections, . . . feeding methods that are painful and futile, and . . .
the tracheostomy tube.” Id.
165. Id. Ilya and Nicholas wanted their father to be offered the level of care that his
clinicians deemed appropriate, including the provision of pain medication and the
termination of “medically futile” treatment. Id.
166. Id. at *5. Initially, the trial court did not find adequate evidence to provide the relief
requested. However, the court appointed a Deputy Public Defender to serve as counsel for
Karl. Mary Shea, Karl’s appointed counsel, prepared a report (“Confidential Status Report
Assessing Conservatee’s Health and Best Interests”). Id. at *3. Shea’s report supported each
of Ilya and Nicholas’s claims. Id. at *10.
167. Id. at *14.
168. Id.
169. No subsequent court materials or journalist accounts of this case have been found.
Such documents might have described events after Ilya’s appointment.
170. See Saillant, supra note 160. Saillant described Olga to have been “fuming.” She
noted that disagreements within the family about Karl’s care related to almost every aspect
of that care, and she described the “enmity” among the Bernsteins as “so great” that Scott
responded to Olga’s having posted photos of herself, Ilya and Nicholas in Karl’s room with
“much larger photographs of himself and his father.” Id.
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Perhaps involvement of an ethics consultation service would
not have rendered the dispute among the Bernsteins less painful for
all of the stakeholders. However, a similar sort of dispute was
resolved more successfully for all of the stakeholders by an ethics
consultation service at “Brookside” Hospital. That ethics
consultation case,171 as well as others resembling both In re Wanglie
and Alexander, are considered in Part V.172
V. RESPONSES OF HOSPITAL ETHICS CONSULTATION SERVICE TO
FUTILITY DISPUTES
The scenario and structure of the dispute described with regard
to the first case presented in this Part resemble the situation
underlying In re Wanglie and Alexander. The scenario and structure
of the dispute in the second ethics case described here resemble
Bernstein.173 Before examining these cases, some background about
the aims and scope of hospital ethics committees and ethics
consultation services is needed. That is provided in Section A of this
Part. Then Section B reviews the two ethics cases.
A. Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultation Services
“Brookside” Hospital created an Ethics Consultation Service174
in 2012. The Hospital is part of a large hospital system in the
Northeast. Brookside’s ethics consultation service has grown
significantly since its creation. Since 2012, Brookside’s service has
responded to scores of cases occasioned by disputes about whether
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining care from a patient.175 The
Brookside cases considered in this Part involve a subset of patients
who faced challenges about end-of-life choices regarding medical
care and who refused, directly or through a surrogate, to consent to
terminating life-sustaining care that the patients’ clinicians deemed
medically inappropriate.
171. See infra Section V.B.
172. See infra Section V.A.
173. The ethics cases resembling In re Wanglie and Alexander are considered in Section
A of this Part; the case resembling Bernstein is considered in Section B.
174. “Brookside” is a pseudonym for the hospital. See Janet L. Dolgin, Resolving Health
Care Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Judicial and Hospital Responses, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 495, 500–05 (2019).
175. All of the ethics consultation cases reviewed in this Article were decided between
2012 and 2017.
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For hospital ethicists, as for judges, disputes pertaining to endof-life care often raise troubling choices.176 Within this set of cases,
a smaller subset has raised questions about futile care.177 On the
whole, in these cases, the notion of futile care, whether identified
by that term or not, is understood to occasion questions about care
deemed non-beneficial and that, in the view of the patient’s
clinicians, could entail further suffering for the patient. Clinicians
at Brookside generally understand futile care as care that lacks any
benefit for the patient beyond the prolongation of physiological
life.178 However, insofar as the care being provided in these cases
sustains physiological processes, that care can be termed futile only
in a limited sense, one heavily dependent on perspective.
The ethics cases that this Article compares with the matching
legal cases reviewed in Part IV were both entertained by the ethics
consultation service at Brookside. The service functions
independently of the hospital’s ethics committee. Ethics
committees are now found in virtually all U.S. hospitals179 and
consider issues similar to those considered by consultation services,
but their work is distinct.180 Often, the work of hospital ethics
176. As a general matter, many of Brookside’s ethics consultation cases have involved
elderly patients facing end-of-life choices. That is not surprising insofar as older people are
more likely than are younger people to be hospitalized. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. &
QUALITY, HCUP FACTS AND FIGURES: STATISTICS ON HOSPITAL-BASED CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK91986/ (noting that “older
people had a greater chance of hospitalization” in 1997 and in 2009).
177. Sometimes the term “futile” is used in the relevant ethics consultation case reports.
Sometimes other terms, such as “medically inappropriate,” are used instead.
178. Clinicians more commonly refer to “ineffective” or “inappropriate” care than to
“futile” care.
179. Mark P. Aulisio, Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the U.S.?, 18 AMA J.
ETHICS 546 (2016), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/05/mhst1-1605.html. In the
early 1990s, the non-profit accrediting group, the Joint Commission, mandated that hospitals
host ethics committees or similar bodies able to respond to medical ethics disputes within
the hospital. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Healthcare Ethics Committees, 22 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 74, 76 (2011) [hereinafter Pope, Legal Briefing] (citing JOINT COMM’N, 2011
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (CAMH): THE OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK § LD.04.02.03 (2011)). It also tests “foundational knowledge.” See AM. SOC’Y FOR
BIOETHICS & HUMANS., Healthcare Ethics Certification Examination Content Outline and Item
Development, https://asbh.org/certification/content-outline (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
180. Some hospital ethics committees designate members of a subcommittee to serve
as consultants. These committee members respond to and assist in resolving medical
disputes and conflicts within the hospital. Robert A. Pearlman, Ethics Committees and
Consultation, U. WASH. SCH. MED., https://depts.washington.edu/bhdept/ethics-medicine/
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committees overlaps with that of ethics consultation services, and,
in some hospitals, differences between ethics committees and ethics
consultation services may be difficult to delineate; the functions of
each group and its position within a hospital’s institutional
structure differ from hospital to hospital. Sometimes ethics
consultants are members of a hospital’s ethics committee
and sometimes they are independent.181 In short, the distinction
between ethics committee members and ethics consultants can
be murky.
Some differences are fairly routine. Ethics committees within
hospitals are composed of unpaid volunteers. They usually include
hospital physicians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, clergy
and one or more members drawn from the lay public. Judith
Henricks, a solicitor and lecturer in law in Britain, noted that ethics
“committees,” despite variation, generally have three primary
functions within hospitals: “education, policy development and
case review.”182
Ethics consultants, usually themselves clinicians, respond to
specific disputes as ethicists. They are increasingly likely to have
undergone specialized training in clinical bioethics.183 Working as
individuals or as members of a team, ethics consultants respond to
“the ethical issues involved in a specific, active clinical case.”184 In
the face of a dispute about patient care, clinicians, patients, and
bioethics-topics/detail/64 (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). The work of an ethics consultation
service is often reviewed by the hospital’s ethics committee, and some ethics consultants
attend ethics committee meetings as members of the larger group.
181. See Andrew M. Courtwright, Joshua Abrams & Ellen M. Robinson, The Role of a
Hospital Ethics Consultation Service in Decision-Making for Unrepresented Patients, 14 J.
BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 241, 242 (2017) (reporting that at Massachusetts General Hospital in
Boston, a senior member of the ethics committee, often accompanied by a more junior
member, carries out individual consultations which are then reviewed by the larger hospital
ethics committee).
182. Judith Hendrick, Legal Aspects of Clinical Ethics Committees, 27 J. MED. ETHICS
(SUPPL. I) i50, i51 (2001).
183. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has created and
recommends a certifying examination that tests several areas of skills capability:
“assessment, analysis, process, evaluation, and quality improvement.” Pope, Legal Briefing,
supra note 179. At Brookside, most ethics consultants have been medical clinicians, but a few
have been attorneys or social workers.
184. Salla Saxén, Untangling Uncertainty: A Study of the Discourses Shaping Clinical Ethics
Consultation as a Professional Practice, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 99, 99 (2016) (quoting J.A. Tulsky
& E. Fox, Evaluating Ethics Consultation: Framing the Questions, 7 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 109,
112 (1996)).

131

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2020

sometimes others can call for an ethics consultation. The work of
hospital ethics consultants is typically labor intensive. Once asked
to help resolve a dispute, ethicists may devote many hours to
conversation with those involved in the dispute—sometimes
individually and sometimes together.
The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has
defined an ethics consultation as follows:
[A] set of services provided by an individual or group in response
to questions from patients, families, surrogates, healthcare
professionals, or other involved parties who seek to resolve
uncertainty or conflict regarding value-laden concerns that
emerge in health care. . . .
....
An ethics consultation is appropriate when there is uncertainty or
conflict about values and a question arises about which decisions
are appropriate or which actions should be taken. An ethics
consultation may be requested to help an individual resolve
uncertainty or conflict or to help resolve uncertainty or conflict
between and among multiple parties.185

The ASBH “Core Competencies” handbook has recommended
that ethics consultants engage in “ethics facilitation.”186 The
handbook characterized the approach as helping to “elucidate
issues, aid effective communication, and integrate the perspectives
of the relevant stakeholders.”187 The handbook identified the
central parameters of the approach to involve “(1) identifying and
analyzing the nature of the value uncertainty, and (2) facilitating
the building of a principled ethical resolution.”188
There is variety among facilities, but as a general matter, ethics
consultants focus on resolving specific disputes among
stakeholders (e.g., patients, family members, clinicians). Some
ethics committees review ethics consultations after the fact. They

185. AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANS., CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTHCARE
ETHICS CONSULTATION 2, 4 (2d ed. 2011). Some critics bemoaned the definition’s vagueness.
See, e.g., Giles R. Scofield, What Is Medical Ethics Consultation?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95,
97 (2008).
186. AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANS., supra note 185, at 6.
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id. The work of the Brookside ethics consultation service reflects those capacities.
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also may assist in developing policies for the hospital (or other
health care facility) that they serve.
B. Resolution by Ethics Consultation Service of Futility Disputes
Between Patients or Their Surrogates and Clinicians
This Part presents two ethics consultation cases. The facts of the
first, the case of “Eddie B.,” resemble In re Wanglie and Alexander.
The facts of the second, the case of “Tom F.,” resemble Bernstein.189
These ethics cases provide a useful framework for comparing the
resolution of futility cases in courts with the resolution of similar
cases by hospital ethics consultation services.
1. “Eddie”190
The case of “Eddie” involved a 68-year-old with multiple
comorbidities, including significant cardiac and renal
insufficiency.191 Eddie was conscious and had some, though
perhaps not full, capacity to make medical decisions. He had not
completed an advance directive. In the absence of a health care
proxy form, state law prescribed that Eddie’s wife, Rachel, would
serve as Eddie’s decision maker should Eddie become incapable of
making his own decisions. He had been receiving hemodialysis but
suggested, at least from time to time, that he did not want
hemodialysis treatment to be continued. Alternately, Eddie
asserted that he wanted his wife, Rachel, to make medical decisions
for him. That led to some confusion insofar as Rachel preferred that
Eddie continue with hemodialysis treatment. Under state law,

189. In re Wanglie, Alexander, and Bernstein are described supra Part IV.
190. Brookside Ethics Consultation Report (identified here as EC20151). The
deidentified report about Eddie B.’s case is in the possession of the Author and has been
made available to the Brigham Young University Law Review’s Editors. The name “Eddie B.”
was chosen at random. Moreover, facts about this hospital patient (and other hospital
patients whose cases are discussed in this Article) have been altered to further protect the
patients’ identities. The names of other people mentioned in connection with Eddie B.’s case
(e.g., Eddie’s clinicians and family members) have similarly been altered. That is true of any
ethics consultation case considered in this Article. These changes were necessary in order to
ensure the absence of any identifying information about any of the participants in the
hospital ethics consultations discussed in this Article.
191. Information about Eddie’s care relevant to this analysis can be found in EC20151.
See supra note 190. That citation is not continually reiterated in footnote references. The
Author has made the deidentified report about Eddie’s case available to the Editors of the
Brigham Young University Law Review.
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Rachel would serve as Eddie’s medical decision maker should
Eddie be deemed to lack medical decision-making capacity. At the
time of the ethics consultation, there were some questions about
whether Eddie enjoyed an adequate level of capacity to engage in
medical decision making for himself. It was clear, however, that
should Eddie be deemed incapable, Rachel would be asked to make
decisions for Eddie.
Eddie’s clinicians had concluded that Eddie was not likely to
live for very long with or without life-sustaining care. They further
stated that the continuation of hemodialysis would cause
unnecessary suffering for Eddie. In fact, one of Eddie’s
nephrologists had expressed the opinion that Eddie was a poor
candidate for hemodialysis.
Eddie’s wife, Rachel, did not deny that her husband was
nearing the end of life. However, she believed that agreeing to the
cessation of life-sustaining treatment was “playing God”—not
something in which she wanted to participate. Rachel refused
hospice care for Eddie after she learned that he would not receive
hemodialysis if placed on hospice care. Similarly, she was
unwilling to allow Eddie to be discharged to their home unless he
would continue to receive hemodialysis treatments.
Eddie’s end-of-life story resembles those of Helga Wanglie and
Elizabeth Alexander in that all three involved a difference of
opinion about the continuation of life-sustaining care between the
patients’ clinicians and their family members. However, Eddie,
unlike Helga Wanglie and Elizabeth Alexander, was at least
sometimes capable of participating in medical decision-making,
and Eddie’s case seemed to involve intermittent disagreement
between the patient and his wife. Yet Eddie’s case resembled In re
Wanglie and Alexander in that, in all three cases, family members
sought continuation of treatment that the patients’ clinicians
deemed medically inappropriate.
Dr. S., an attending physician at Brookside who was involved
in Eddie’s care, sought an ethics consultation. He asked the hospital
ethics consultants to help resolve the conflict between Eddie’s wife
and Eddie’s clinicians about whether to continue Eddie’s
hemodialysis and to review a possible conflict between Eddie and
his wife about Eddie’s care. The ethics consultation service
envisioned its role to include responding as positively and as
helpfully as possible in light of the challenges facing Eddie and
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those caring for him. In comparison with the court cases considered
in Section A of Part IV,192 the ethics consultants enjoyed more
flexibility than did the judges who were, in the nature of their
institutional setting, constrained by the shape and posture of
particular legal disputes. This flexibility allowed the hospital
ethicists to approach questions about care with concern for Eddie’s
autonomous choices and for the burden facing Rachel, Eddie’s wife
and surrogate decision maker.
The ethics consultants sought appropriate services for Eddie
and Rachel, including help for Rachel, who was already grieving,
with the process of bereavement; even though Eddie was alive, he
seemed clearly to be dying. The ethics consultants further
considered options for Eddie and Rachel that had not been
entertained in the original narratives presented to them by the
stakeholders. For instance, the ethics consultants conferred with the
hospital’s social services department to discern whether it might be
possible to find a placement for Eddie in a subacute care facility
and, if so, whether Rachel would accept that option. Further, the
ethics consultants continued to convene meetings that included
Eddie, Rachel, other relatives, Eddie’s clinicians, and members of
the ethics consultation service. The service used these meetings to
facilitate appreciation for Eddie’s autonomy, however diminished
his capacity had become, as well as for the preferences and needs
of Eddie’s relatives and the burden on his clinicians who were
being asked to provide care that they did not deem helpful. Finally,
the service recommended—absent compelling shifts in Eddie’s
situation—that all parties try to refrain from suggesting new
preferences regarding Eddie’s care, especially if those shifts would
have significantly reshaped the terms of care. The consultants
grounded this suggestion in their perception that continuity and
stability in Eddie’s care were important for all of the stakeholders.
These options were available to the hospital ethicists because
the ethics consultation service that entertained Eddie’s case
functioned within a very different framework than that which
defined and structured the court proceedings in In re Wanglie and
Alexander.193 Thus, the consultation service exercised greater
192. See supra Section IV.A.
193. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Prob. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 (1991); Alexander v. Scripps Mem’l Hosp. La Jolla, 232
Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 740 (Ct. App. 2018).
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flexibility in the sort of help it could offer and the process through
which it identified that help than did (or could) either of the courts.
Brookside’s ethics consultation service saw itself as responsible for
the welfare of Eddie, for that of his wife, who suffered under the
burden of making decisions for her dying husband, and for the
welfare of the clinicians responsible for Eddie’s care in the hospital.
Unlike the courts, the ethicists—while acknowledging the
significant challenges inherent in futility cases—could avoid
choosing among decision makers and opining about the
appropriateness of the treatment at issue for Eddie. The ethics
consultants were able to focus directly on the needs and concerns
of each of the stakeholders.
While cases such as Eddie’s, In re Wanglie, and Alexander raise
significant challenges for hospital ethics consultants and for courts,
the approach of the Brookside ethics consultation service, as
compared with that of the courts, encouraged deliberation and
reevaluation. Neither court attempted—and in the nature of the
judicial enterprise, neither court could easily have attempted—to
redefine the community for which it was responsible and to craft a
response in light of “care” owed not only to the patient but also to
the patient’s family and, even, to the patient’s clinicians.
In contrast, the ethicists involved in Eddie’s case seemed to
agree with Eddie’s clinicians that continuing care held little medical
benefit for Eddie. But that did not settle the matter for them. For the
ethics consultants who responded to Eddie’s case, concern about
the continuation of futile treatment was qualified by concern about
the needs and anxieties of Eddie, his wife, and his clinicians. Were
Eddie the only party for whose welfare the ethics service accepted
responsibility in this case, it might have encouraged the initiation
of hospice care (and thus the termination of life-sustaining care) for
Eddie. Instead, the service included Rachel among those for whom
it felt responsible. The ethics consultation service acknowledged
Rachel’s “caregiver burden” and her pain as she watched a beloved
spouse die. In this regard, the ethicists’ approach resembled that of
the court in In re Wanglie in seeking a framework within which to
attend to the patient’s family as well as to the patient. In both
Eddie’s case and that of Helga Wanglie, a vision of communal
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(family) autonomy replaced the more usual presumption in the
United States that has favored individual autonomy.194
Further, the hospital ethicists considered the wisdom of relying
on “the tincture of time” before making additional determinate
decisions about Eddie’s care. That position has particular merit in a
case that poses one important value—patient or family
autonomy—against another set of values—the “right” of patients’
clinicians to limit life-sustaining care for those for whom medical
recovery seems virtually impossible. Again, this is an option that,
in the nature of their responsibilities and governing rules, was not
available to the courts.
The ethics consultation service’s broad view of its mission in
Eddie’s case encouraged the ethicists to seek a far-reaching
accommodation that might serve all of the stakeholders. First, they
defined an essential conflict at issue in Eddie’s medical care: that
conflict occurred at the place in which the “technically possible”
diverged from the “medically beneficial.” That divergence serves
well to contextualize claims about futile care. A medical procedure
or treatment may be possible; it may accomplish technology’s goals
(e.g., to sustain physiological function) but may still be considered
to violate the bioethical principle of clinician beneficence
(sometimes understood as nonmaleficence).195
Continued life-sustaining treatments were available for Eddie
but were not considered beneficial by his clinicians (nor, it seemed,
by Eddie, though his competence was compromised and his
conclusions about what he wanted done changed over time). That
concern might suggest that life-sustaining care, no longer beneficial
to the patient, should be terminated. But the ethics consultation
service recognized a second, equally powerful concern—to protect
and support those who loved Eddie as he moved through the
process of dying. In the face of that concern, claims about the futility
of continuing care, however well-founded, were not determinative.
In effect, in Eddie’s case, family autonomy trumped concerns about
futile care.

194. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
195. “Nonmaleficence” has become a central principle in medical ethics. See
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 150–54. Beauchamp and Childress explain that
nonmaleficence “has been treated as effectively identical to the celebrated maxim Primum
non nocere: ‘Above all [or first] do no harm.’” Id. at 150.
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In short, all of these cases developed around several competing
values. First, the importance of patient autonomy was deeply
inscribed in medical ethics by the end of the twentieth century.
Second, society and the law have increasingly recognized the
disadvantages of sustaining life at all costs, especially for patients
without consciousness and without a reasonable hope for recovery.
Third, the ethics consultation service at Brookside shaped
a perspective that prized autonomy but that broadened that value’s
reach to groups that encompass individual patients but also
extend beyond them to include their family members and other
loved ones.
2. “Tom F.”196
The facts of Tom F.’s case resemble those of Bernstein, decided
by a California court in 2018, in that the dispute at the center of each
case was intrafamilial.197 Tom’s ethics case commenced in 2013
when a physician at Brookside involved with Tom’s care requested
help from the hospital’s ethics consultation service. Concern
revolved around how best to respond in light of an intrafamilial
conflict about whether to provide life-sustaining care for Tom.
At the time, Tom was seventy-nine years old. He had been
diagnosed with dementia, Parkinson’s disease, hypertension, and
renal failure.198 Tom was not capable of making medical decisions.
Moreover, he had not completed an advance directive.
His immediate family all reported that Tom had never talked about
death or dying. None of them knew what Tom would have
wanted done.
Before he was hospitalized, Tom had been living with his
daughter, Rosalie. For that reason, other family members agreed
initially that Rosalie would serve as her father’s primary surrogate
decision maker. Pursuant to state law,199 Rosalie and Hiram,
196. Brookside Ethics Consultation Report (identified here as EC20131). As with the
case of “Eddie B.,” the name of the patient in this case as well as those of others involved
in the case have been altered to protect the privacy of those involved. In addition, some
of the facts of the patient’s story have been altered in order to protect the privacy of all of
those involved.
197. See supra Section IV.B.
198. EC20131, supra note 196. As noted in introducing the case of Eddie B., the
deidentified report about this patient’s case is in the possession of the Author and the Law
Review. The name “Tom F.” was chosen at random.
199. Family Health Care Decisions Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d (2010).
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Tom’s son, had equal status as potential surrogates for their father
unless, together, they agreed that one of them would take
primary responsibility.
Soon, it became clear that Rosalie’s preferences for her father’s
care conflicted with those of Hiram, and those of Tom’s sister,
Grace. Rosalie favored hemodialysis for her father, hoping that
with hemodialysis, he would be able to return to her home. Grace
and Hiram, reflecting the view of Tom’s clinicians, opposed
hemodialysis. Rosalie explained that her father’s quality of life
depended on his receiving hemodialysis. But Tom’s doctors did not
think hemodialysis made sense at that time given Tom’s seriously
compromised health status.
The ethics consultants informed themselves about Tom’s
medical situation. That allowed them to establish a frame within
which to communicate with all of the stakeholders. A review of
medical literature suggested that initiating hemodialysis augured a
poor prognosis for Tom, given his age and comorbidities. For the
ethicists, this information suggested that a decision to withhold
hemodialysis made medical sense and could, thus, be justified
ethically but that a decision to initiate hemodialysis could also be
justified ethically.
The ethicists shared their perspective on Tom’s medical
situation with his family. They facilitated sustained conversation
among Rosalie, Hiram, and Grace—sometimes also including
Tom’s clinicians. The ethics consultants further arranged for
Rosalie to meet with members of the hospital’s palliative care
service. Rosalie’s conversation with the palliative care team
encouraged her to reconsider her original position and brought her
preferences more in line with those of her sibling and aunt.
Ultimately, Rosalie agreed with other family members and with her
father’s clinicians that Tom’s best interests would be served by his
foregoing hemodialysis.
In short, the labor-intensive work of the ethicists in Tom’s case
resulted in the development of intrafamilial harmony about Tom’s
care. It was decided that, once stabilized, Tom would return to
Rosalie’s home where he had been living. There he would receive
“conservative
management”
rather
than
hemodialysis.
Achievement of intrafamilial agreement clearly distinguishes
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Tom’s case from that of Karl Bernstein.200 There, conflict among
family members became more and more acrimonious until two of
Karl’s children went to court to deprive their half-brother of any
control over medical decision-making for their father, Karl.201
In their medical report, the ethicists noted that Tom’s children
and his sister all agreed to preserve the option of initiating
hemodialysis in the future. This was an important component of
Rosalie’s joining her relatives in the decision to forego hemodialysis
for her father, at least temporarily. The ethicists ensured that the
family’s current agreement about Tom’s care did not close the door
to hemodialysis should Tom’s situation change, making that choice
more reasonable. It was hoped that, with a diet shaped for Tom’s
needs, he could soon be discharged to return home with Rosalie.
Brookside’s ethics consultants presumed that Tom’s relatives
and clinicians were well-intentioned and that each group aimed to
identify a course of treatment for Tom that would benefit him. In
this, the service focused on the patient’s moral agency, a concern
that can easily be considered during an ethics consultation but that
is not likely to be of explicit concern in court proceedings. In some
part, the ethicists’ conversations with each of the stakeholders,
sometimes individually and sometimes together, proceeded
positively because they presumed the goodwill of everyone
involved. Further, that perspective facilitated the ethics
consultants’ displacing discrepant individual choices with a
communal choice. Even more, the ethics consultants safeguarded
the autonomous choices of Tom’s family and identified a
reasonable set of options for Tom’s end-of-life care that could be
accepted by each of the stakeholders. The case shows the benefits
of an approach to futility disputes that takes the concerns and needs
of all of the stakeholders into account, shows respect for each, and
encourages open discussion among those stakeholders, guided by
the hospital’s ethics consultants.
The Bernstein court focused on resolving the dispute among
members of the patient’s family. In contrast, the Brookside ethics
consultation service that attended to Tom F.’s situation reviewed
medical literature as well as case law in order to establish a frame

200. Bernstein v. Superior Ct., No. B212067, 2009 WL 224942 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009);
see supra Section IV.B.
201. See supra Section IV.B.
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within which to mediate among the parties.202 Further, the ethics
consultation service focused on the concerns and needs of all of the
stakeholders—the patient, family members, and clinicians—and
engaged in serious conversations with each. It must, however, be
acknowledged, that even the most proficient and wise ethics
consultants cannot always resolve disputes to the satisfaction of
each of the stakeholders. In such cases, court review can provide an
enforceable resolution to an apparently intractable dispute. That
resolution may not be the best for all of the stakeholders, but it does
settle a dispute about patient care with a finality (at least after the
exhaustion of appeals) that eludes the authority of ethics
consultation services. That said, resolution of such disputes within
hospitals in a process guided by trained ethics consultants is almost
always preferable to the initiation of court proceedings.203
CONCLUSION
The challenges faced by legislators, judges, and hospital ethics
consultants in responding to futility disputes reflect the difficult
202. Perhaps no ethics consultation service could have rendered the dispute among the
Bernsteins less ferocious and painful. The history of Karl Bernstein’s case may show that not
all bioethics interventions can ease disputes among family members. In fact, a hospital
bioethics committee (though not an ethics consultation service) reviewed Karl’s case fairly
early on in the course of Karl’s care and then, again, several years later. Bernstein, 2009 WL
224942, at *4. The committee was not acting as an ethics consultation service but as an
advisory body, offering guidance on what it saw as appropriate responses concerning Karl
Bernstein’s end-of-life care. Such guidance from hospital bioethics committees may be
desired by clinicians for whom it may provide some protection should a malpractice suit
arise. The hospital’s bioethics committee reviewed Karl’s situation and documented what, in
its view, was the right course of action. Id. There are several explanations for the committee’s
failure to ease the conflict. None can be confirmed. The hospital ethics committee assumed
an advisory role and did not engage in the labor-intensive work usually undertaken by
trained hospital ethics consultants. Id. The committee did not respond and did not seem to
see its job to include responding to the needs and values of the stakeholders as individuals
or as a group. In this regard, the committee’s work and its view of that work differed
significantly from the work of the Brookside ethics consultation service. It is possible that
members of the hospital ethics committee would have told this story differently. The account
here relies on the text of the court’s decision. Id. It does seem clear, however, that the
committee, for whatever reason, was unable to negotiate or forge a consensus between Scott
and other members of the patient’s family. In some part, the ethics committee’s response
reflects the limitations inherent in the structure of most ethics committees as compared with
that of ethics consultation services (hospital insiders who respond to ethics disputes as
clinicians). See supra Section V.A (describing scope of ethics committees and ethics
consultation services).
203. See generally O’Callaghan, supra note 114 for a searing critique of one statutory
response to futility disputes.
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challenges inherent in most disputes about patient care among
patients, family members, or clinicians. Even more than in other
sorts of medical disputes, those involving clinicians’ claims of
medical futility occasion conflicting values that can be extremely
difficult to reconcile. Often patient autonomy is sacrificed for
clinician beneficence and medical integrity or beneficence and
integrity are sacrificed for autonomy.
It is possible that medicine and society’s increasing interest in
providing for ease in dying will result in fewer patients or
surrogates asking to have life-sustaining care continued in the sorts
of situations considered in this Article. Should that happen,
medical futility will be less and less likely to spark disputes
between patients (or their surrogates) and clinicians and thus
disputes between patients or their surrogates and clinicians seeking
the termination of care deemed futile will arise less frequently.
Yet, at present, the many concerns faced by patients and
surrogates at the end of a patient’s life suggest that futility disputes
are not likely soon to disappear. The concerns at issue may be
grounded in the initiation of the grieving process for patients’
family members, in the belief that “something” should be done for
the patient, in the moral burden carried by clinicians asked to
provide care they deem inappropriate, and in fear of death itself.
Each of the institutional responses to futility disputes examined in
this Article entails at least some shortcoming. That is almost
inevitable in the face of the challenging moral dilemmas inherent
in futility disputes. That said, ethics consultants, far more than
judges or legislators, are able to respond flexibly and to heed the
needs and concerns of, and show respect for, all of the stakeholders
in attempting to direct those involved in a futility dispute toward a
mutually acceptable set of responses.
As a general matter, the least felicitous set of approaches to
futility disputes has been crafted in state legislatures. Among the
statutes promulgated in the states, most are vague and fail to offer
adequate guidance or protection to the stakeholders.204 One state
law that avoids those limitations, that promulgated in Texas,
imposes a draconian process for resolving futility disputes—one

204. Pope, No Safe Harbor, supra note 68, at 68.
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that eviscerates due process.205 Court review, in its turn, brings the
benefits of enforceability. But courts are limited by the terms of
their task. In that regard, hospital ethics consultants are more likely
to exercise flexibility and to be free to attend to each of the
stakeholders and to all of them, as a group. That can carry great
significance in cases almost always identified with human emotion
and that occasion ultimate questions about life and death. Hospital
ethicists are equipped to encourage the development of
relationships and to guide those involved in futility disputes to
listen carefully to each other. In that light, hospitals should be
encouraged to support ethics services and to ensure that ethics
consultants are wisely trained.

205. See supra Section III.B and accompanying text (reviewing the Texas Advance
Directive Law).
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